The next war

Barack Obama is apparently looking to add some Iranians to his list of victims.  Here's how his administration is dealing with that pesky National Intelligence Estimate that claimed that Iran abandoned its nuclear weapons program in 2003:

Little more than a year after U.S. spy agencies concluded that Iran had halted work on a nuclear weapon, the Obama administration has made it clear that it believes there is no question that Tehran is seeking the bomb.

In his news conference this week, President Obama went so far as to describe Iran's "development of a nuclear weapon" before correcting himself to refer to its "pursuit" of weapons capability. [...]

The language reflects the extent to which senior U.S. officials now discount a National Intelligence Estimate issued in November 2007 that was instrumental in derailing U.S. and European efforts to pressure Iran to shut down its nuclear program. [...]

U.S. officials said that although no new evidence had surfaced to undercut the findings of the 2007 estimate, there was growing consensus that it provided a misleading picture and that the country was poised to reach crucial bomb-making milestones this year.

Got that?  The NIE was taken so seriously that it effectively balked the Bush administration's attempt to push for an attack on Iran, but the Obama administration is nonetheless determined to toss it aside—even in the absence of any new information that contradicts it.  Which also means that Obama's repeated overblown claims about Iran's quest for nuclear weapons weren't anomalies, but the leading edge of a new official policy.

So I'd say we can safely ignore the smoke Obama was blowing this week about "sitting across the table face to face" with Iran in the next few months.  Given the above, it seems likely that the main purpose of that kind of talk (and any attendant pro forma follow through) is to provide the illusion of a good-faith effort at diplomacy, while preparing the way for public acceptance of a military attack on Iran.  The Obama administration is just adopting the tried and true formula that we've seen most recently in the Bush administration's push for war with Iraq: pretend to be engaging diplomatically while vastly exaggerating the threat (by distorting intelligence, among other things), further pretend that those diplomatic overtures have failed, and then blame the already-planned assault on the malicious fist-clenching intransigence of the victim.

I'd assume the eventual attack will be launched by the Israeli branch of the U.S. military, with the usual overt and covert military and diplomatic backing by the United States.  I say that because the Obama administration's rhetorical buildup and intelligence-molding is happening hand in hand with a marked increase in belligerent statements from Israeli officials, like this:

A senior Israeli diplomat has warned that Israel is ready to launch a military offensive against Iran to prevent it from developing nuclear weapons.

In an interview with The Age, Dan Gillerman, who was Israel's permanent representative at the United Nations from 2003 until last September, said time for diplomatic efforts to stop Iran acquiring a nuclear capability might have already expired.

"The world cannot afford to live with a nuclear Iran," Mr Gillerman said.

It's possible that the Israelis just happen to be ratcheting up their war talk at the same time the Obama administration is spouting alarmist rhetoric and pushing aside the major impediment to war with Iran, of course, but I don't believe that any more than I believe it was a coincidence that Israel pulled back on its Gaza assault just before Obama's inauguration.  No, there's every indication that the U.S. and Israel are cooperating very closely under Obama, and so it seems likely to me that a decision to attack Iran has already been taken and the mutual planning is underway.  (And to be clear, I'd guess that the Israelis are the ones pushing the hardest—but the U.S. is a willing co-conspirator.)

So barring any major surprises, at this point it's just a matter of time.

Comments

[SteveB]

I always figured the Bush administration's failure to attack Iran was simply out of concern about the blowback it would produce on U.S. troops in Iraq. Is this no longer a consideration? Are plans to draw down U.S. forces in Iraq part of an effort to limit Iran's ability to strike back? If so, it's hard to see how that works, since we're simultaneously increasing the number of troops in Afghanistan, which also provides opportunities for Iranian retaliation, covert or otherwise.

[John Caruso]

I'd say it was the problems in Iraq more generally, which made the prospect of adding a third war to the pile something even the zealots in the Bush administration could see would be a bad idea. But I'm guessing this will be an Israeli-branded attack, which will put the U.S. at a distant remove from direct responsibility. I also think it's going to be a single attack (like the Israeli strike on Syria), not an extended campaign.

This is all speculation, of course. But I don't buy that the administration's escalation of rhetoric or its attempts to undermine the NIE are just ways to stake out a stronger bargaining position (as Joseph Cirincione speculates in the article), and it doesn't make sense otherwise if the object is peace. But it does make perfect sense (especially in combination with Israel's saber-rattling) if they're preparing the path for an attack.

[Harold M]

I think it's possible that the Obama regime simply has no idea how to proceed and is falling back on vicious blustering stupidity to buy some time. The driving consensus in all the elite outlets is that "Iran must be dealt with". They differ on what that entails, but they agree that something must be done. The pundits and insiders chivvy and nip at each other to make sure everyone knows how "hard headed" and "realistic" they can be. The liberal hawks are the worst of the bunch. In such circumstances there's a race to the rhetorical bottom. The race itself will most likely define the actual approach.

[John Caruso]

I'd agree with most of that, though I don't think the administration's approach is quite so haphazard. I'd especially agree with what you say about the "driving consensus"—and that consensus is one of the reasons I feel a military strike is all but inevitable, since it precludes any peaceful resolution (barring Iran completely knuckling under to the unreasonable and unfair demands being made upon it, which seems highly unlikely).